utopia

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Premise 1: There exists a procedure (P1) that can compute optimal creativity and an optimal experience of fun.

Justification: If artificial general intelligence and whole brain emulation is possible then this implies that it is possible to capture creativity and experiences such as fun in a purely mechanical, algorithmic fashion.

Premise 2: There exists a procedure (P2) for which it is possible to perfectly comprehend P1, in the same sense that it is possible for humans to comprehend the rules of Tic-tac-toe.

Justification: If it is possible for an artificial general intelligence or whole brain emulation to improve itself considerably then this implies that it is possible for those agents to understand themselves sufficiently.

Tic Tac Toe

Tic Tac Toe

From the subjective viewpoint of P1, being computed is fun and creative. I will label this view, in function notation, as inside_view(P1). Or, in other words, how an algorithm feels from inside.

From the subjective viewpoint of P2, being computed means to perfectly understand what P1 is doing and how it is doing it. I will call this function outside_view(P1).

Premise 3: A human being (possibly given a hypothetical intelligence amplification) could incorporate P2. I will label this function human_P2().

What value would human_P2() assign to he computation of P1? I will label the computation of P1 compute(P1).

human_P2(compute(P1)) =

(1) Uninteresting (dull). Similarly to computing all possible games of Tic-tac-toe.

(2) Intrinsically valuable. The more resources are used to compute P1, the better.

What I perceive to be problematic is #2. What differences would it make to run P1, (1) once (2) N times (3) not at all?

Personally I assign little value to the repeated computation of something that I already understand thoroughly. Which does not mean that the algorithm itself would share my perception. But why should I care about that? As long as suffering has been eradicated, what difference would it make if the whole universe was used to compute an uninteresting algorithm (outside view) compared to a universe that does nothing in particular?

There are two possibilities:

(1) I could observe the computation of P1 from the outside (possibly until the heat death of the universe).

(2) I could turn myself into P1 and experience fun and creativity.

Why would I care about either 1 or 2 if I completely understand those possibilities and don’t expect any surprises that are conceptually more interesting than coming across a Feynman point?

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The thought experiment:

Jürgen is a brilliant artificial general intelligence (AGI) researcher who investigates the world from a purely mathematical point of view.

He specializes in a formal theory of fun and creativity and acquires, let us suppose, all the physical information there is to obtain about what goes on when we enjoy music, or create art, and utter sentences like ‘This is fun!’, ‘I feel great!’,  ‘This music is very emotive!’, and so on.

He discovers, for example, just which musical pieces are more interesting or aesthetically rewarding than others, and exactly how this can be mechanistically described and produced by a computable algorithm that results in the creation and perception of optimally appealing art and music.

What will happen when Jürgen eventually computes the algorithm? Will he learn anything or not?


Note:

The past two posts – The value of philosophy in a universe ruled by a friendly AI and Utopia is dull – have been written in order to analyze the expected value of living in a world after a benevolent technological singularity took place.

The expected value of the event of a technological singularity itself is distinct from the value of the time between this event and the heat death of the universe. Given that a positive technological singularity could end all suffering, it is intrinsically valuable to achieve it.


Jürgen, our AGI researcher, has two options:

(1) Jürgen could decide that the discovery of a algorithm that can produce optimal fun and creativity makes any human attempt to have fun, and to be creative, futile and of no additional value.

(2) Jürgen could decide that it would be valuable to turn the whole universe into a computational substrate computing his algorithm in order to maximize fun and creativity.

With which option you agree partly depends on the answer to the thought experiment outlined above. Will Jürgen learn anything new from computing the algorithm?

(1) Given that you believe that Jürgen will not learn anything new from computing his algorithm, what difference is there between a universe that contains his algorithm, and a universe that computes the algorithm as often as possible? In other words, Jürgen solved and proved a mathematical problem. What value is there in solving and proving it over and over again?

(2) Given that you believe that Jürgen will learn something from computing his algorithm, then once his algorithm computed an optimal, or nearly optimal, result, what difference would it make to compute it N times?

Again, the question here is not about the value of discovering such an algorithm. The question is not even about computing it once. The question is about the expected value of living in a universe where such an algorithm already exists.

To clarify the above, consider a different algorithm. Let’s call it Much-Better-Life Simulator™. Running Much-Better-Life Simulator™ is equivalent to the most enjoyable life a human being could ever experience.

What difference would it make to run Much-Better-Life Simulator™ (1) once (2) N times (3) not at all? What do you estimate is the expected value of 1, 2 and 3? And how confident are you about that estimate? Can you explain what difference it makes?

More specifically, consider the value humans assign to music and art. As described in my previous posts, the value of creating music and art will be diminished by (1) the instant availability and integrability of the best possible and perceptible permutations of art and music (2) a perfectly understood, integrable and implementable mechanistic algorithm which can yield the most emotive and appealing music and art that is provably possible. In other words, anything you could ever achieve has already been achieved in the best possible way when that algorithm had been discovered.

But what about enjoying art and music? As human enjoyment is perfectly understood as well, it will be possible to generate an optimal experience of either listening to music, enjoying art, or composing and creating it. All other permutations will be provably less desirable. There will be exactly one perfect experience of either enjoying or creating music and art.

You could either integrate such an experience, as if it has already happened, or run a simulation. Afterwards you could run all less desirable permutations of it, or run it over and over again. Which raises the question of what difference it makes to have a universe in which all matter is converted in order to be excited, compared to a universe where you perfectly understand what excitement is, but choose not to compute it?

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Imagine that, after your death, you were cryogenically frozen and eventually resurrected in a benevolent utopia ruled by a godlike artificial intelligence.

Naturally, you desire to read up on what has happened after your death. It turns out that you do not have to read anything, but merely desire to know something and the knowledge will be integrated as if it had been learnt in the most ideal and unbiased manner. If certain cognitive improvements are necessary to understand certain facts, your computational architecture will be expanded appropriately.

You now perfectly understand everything that has happened and what has been learnt during and after the technological singularity, that took place after your death. You understand the nature of reality, consciousness, and general intelligence.

Concepts such as creativity or fun are now perfectly understood mechanical procedures that you can easily implement and maximize, if desired. If you wanted to do mathematics, you could trivially integrate the resources of a specialized Matrioshka brain into your consciousness and implement and run an ideal mathematician.

But you also learnt that everything you could do has already been done, and that you could just integrate that knowledge as well, if you like. All that is left to be discovered is highly abstract mathematics that requires the resources of whole galaxy clusters.

So you instead consider to explore the galaxy. But you become instantly aware that the galaxy is unlike the way it has been depicted in old science fiction novels. It is just a wasteland, devoid of any life. There are billions of barren planets, differing from each other only in the most uninteresting ways.

But surely, you wonder, there must be fantastic virtual environments to explore. And what about sex? Yes, sex! But you realize that you already thoroughly understand what it is that makes exploration and sex fun. You know how to implement the ideal adventure in which you save people of maximal sexual attractiveness. And you also know that you could trivially integrate the memory of such an adventure, or simulate it a billion times in a few nanoseconds, and that the same is true for all possible permutations that are less desirable.

You realize that the universe has understood itself.

The movie has been watched.

The game has been won.

The end.


A quote from the novel Ventus, by Karl Schroeder:

The view was breathtaking. From here, beyond the orbit of Neptune, Axel could see the evidence of humanity’s presence in the form of a faint rainbowed disk of light around the tiny sun. Scattered throughout it were delicate sparkles, each some world-sized Dyson engine or fusion starlette. Earth was just one of a hundred thousand pinpricks of light in that disk. Starlettes lit the coldest regions of the system, and all the planets were ringed with habitats and the conscious, fanatical engines of the solarforming civilization. This was the seat of power for the human race, and for many gods as well. It was ancient, implacably powerful, and in its trillions of inhabitants habored more that was alien than the rest of the galaxy put together.

Axel hated the place.

[…]

If he shut his eyes he could open a link to the outer edge of the inscape, the near-infinite datanet that permeated the Archipelago. He chose not to do this.

[…]

“Isn’t it marvellous?” she said as she came to stand next to him. “I have never been here! Not physically, I mean.” She was dressed in her illusions again, today in a tiny whirlwind of strategically timed leaves: Eve in some medieval painter’s fantasy.

“You haven’t missed much,” he said.

Marya blinked. “How can you say that?” She went to lean on the window, her fingers indenting its resilient surface. “It is everything!”

“That’s what I hate about it.” He shrugged. “I don’t know how people can live here, permanently linked into inscape. All you can ever really learn is that everything you’ve ever done or thought has been done and thought before, only better. The richest billionaire has to realize that the gods next door take no more notice of him than he would a bug. And why go explore the galaxy when anything conceivable can be simulated inside your own head?

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